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Abstract—
A promising avenue for improving the effectiveness of behavioral-
based malware detectors would be to combine fast (usually not highly
accurate) traditional machine learning detectors with high-accuracy, but
time-consuming deep learning models. The main idea would be to
place software receiving borderline classifications by traditional machine
learning methods in an environment where uncertainty is added, while
software is analyzed by more time-consuming deep learning models.
The goal of uncertainty would be to rate-limit actions of potential mal-
ware during the time consuming deep analysis.
In this paper, we present a detailed description of the analysis
and implementation, and also provide new extensions of CHAMELEON1,
a framework for realizing this uncertain environment for Linux.
CHAMELEON offers two environments for software: (i) standard—for any
software identified as benign by conventional machine learning methods
and (ii) uncertain—for software receiving borderline classifications when
analyzed by these conventional machine learning methods. The uncer-
tain environment adds obstacles to software execution through random
perturbations applied probabilistically on selected system calls. We
evaluated CHAMELEON with 113 applications from common benchmarks
and 100 malware samples for Linux. Our results showed that at thresh-
old 10%, intrusive and non-intrusive strategies caused approximately
65% of malware to fail accomplishing their tasks, while approximately
30% of the analyzed benign software to meet with various levels of dis-
ruption. With a dynamic, per-system call threshold, CHAMELEON caused
92% of the malware to fail, and only 10% of the benign software to be
disrupted. We also found that I/O-bound software was three times more
affected by uncertainty than CPU-bound software. Further, we analyzed
the logs of software crashed with non-intrusive strategies, and found that
some crashes are due to the software bugs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Attacks are continuously evolving and existing protection
mechanisms have not been coping well with the increased
sophistication of attacks, especially advanced persistent
threats (APTs), which target organizations. Malware used in
1. This work is an extension of The Dose Makes the Poison–
Leveraging Uncertainty for Effective Malware Detection published at
IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing 2017, DOI:
10.1109/DESEC.2017.8073803
APTs attempts to blend in with approved corporate software
and traffic, and act slowly, thus evading detection. As a
result, by the time an APT attack is discovered, sensitive in-
formation has already been exfiltrated and many computers
have been compromised, making recovery difficult [1, 2].
Real-time malware detection is challenging. The indus-
try still relies on antivirus technology for threat detection
[3, 4], which is effective for malware with known signa-
tures, but not sustainable given the massive amount of new
malware samples released daily. Additionally, since zero-
day malware has no known signature, and polymorphic
and metamorphic attacks constantly change their patterns,
signature scanning operates at a practical detection rate
of only 25% to 50% [5]. Alternative approaches identify
behavioral properties, such as unusual sequences of system
calls, and use behavioral patterns to characterize malware.
However, research has shown that behavior-based detectors
suffer from a high false-positive rate [6, 7], because of the
increasing complexity and diversity of current software.
Aggressive heuristics, such as erring on the side of blocking
suspicious software, can interfere with employee productivity,
resulting in employees overriding or circumventing security
policies.
Recently, deep learning has achieved state-of-the-art re-
sults in a broad spectrum of applications, and has been
considered a promising direction for behavior-based ap-
proaches with high detection rates. However, the direct ap-
plication of pure deep learning methods in practical, on-the-
fly malware detection is challenging, because deep learning
algorithms require more computation time for classifica-
tion (about one hundred orders of magnitude higher than
conventional machine learning algorithms), and a consid-
erable amount of time and memory for re-training, as new
malware samples become available. Incremental retraining
is a common requirement for malware detection, as new
variants and samples are regularly discovered and added to
the training set.
Thus, it seems that there is a trade-off for behavioral-
based malware detection solutions. If the solution prioritizes
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speed with fast conventional machine learning algorithms, it
might lose accuracy and risk generating high false positive
rates. If the solution prioritizes accuracy, it might not be
entirely practical for on-the-fly application given the compu-
tational overhead of emerging deep learning methods: long
re-training time and memory resources and higher response
time for classification.
A promising solution would be to have the best of
these two worlds: combining both conventional machine
learning methods and emerging deep learning methods and
applying them where their advantages are leveraged and
their limitations are downplayed, via a two-phase detection
stage. The main idea is as follows. All software in the system
starts running in a standard OS environment and is contin-
uously monitored through a behavioral detector based on
conventional machine learning algorithms, which provide
fast classification and retraining. If a piece of software
receives a borderline classification (i.e., reaches a threshold
set by the system administrator), it is moved to an un-
certain environment. In this environment the software will
experience probabilistic and random perturbations, whose
severity will depend on whether the software is whitelisted.
The goal of these perturbations is to thwart the actions of
potential malware or compromised benign software while
deep learning analysis is underway. If the deep analysis
finds the software benign, it is placed back in the standard
environment, where it is again continuously monitored.
In this paper, we present a detailed description of the
design and implementation, as well as new extensions of
CHAMELEON, a framework realizing this spectrum OS be-
havior for Linux. CHAMELEON has the potential to allow
the successful combination of conventional machine learn-
ing detection methods with the power of emerging deep
learning models for real-time, on-the-fly malware detection
with the goal to protect organization computers against
sophisticated and stealthy malware.
Today, it is standard practice for organizations to restrict
or whitelist mission-critical software used by their employ-
ees [6]. Employees are supposed to only use approved
software tied to their primary task and are allowed to use
some personal software. CHAMELEON applies non-intrusive
strategies (e.g., delay a system call execution) to whitelisted
software, and intrusive strategies (e.g., increase or decrease
the bytes in a buffer passed as a parameter to a system call)
to non-whitelisted software.
CHAMELEON allows the introduction of perturbations to
the execution of software running in the uncertain environ-
ment, with the goal to “buy time for deep learning-based
detectors to provide a definitive and accurate classification of
a piece of software. CHAMELEON has the potential to allow
the successful combination of ML detection methods with
the power of DL for real-time malware detection to protect
computer infrastructures in organizations. CHAMELEON has
the potential to advance systems security, as it can (i) make
systems diverse by design because of the unpredictable ex-
ecution in the uncertain environment, (ii) increase attackers’
workload, and (iii) decrease the speed of attacks and their
chance of success.
We evaluated CHAMELEON [8] with 100 samples of
Linux malware and 113 common software from several
categories. Our results show that at a threshold of 10%,
intrusive strategies thwart 62% of malware, while non-
intrusive strategies caused a failure rate of 68%. At threshold
50%, the percentage of adversely affected malware increased
to 81% and 76% respectively. With a 10% threshold, the per-
turbations also cause various levels of disruption (crash or
hampered execution) to approximately 30% of the analyzed
benign software. With a 50% threshold, the percentage of
software adversely affected raised to 50%. We also found
that I/O-bound software was three times more affected by
uncertainty than CPU-bound software.
In this paper we introduced an optional dynamic, per-
system call perturbation threshold. Our analysis show that
the application of such personalized threshold caused 92%
of the malware to fail to accomplish their tasks, and im-
pacted only 10% of the benign software. Compared with a
static threshold, this personalized threshold corresponded
to an increase in 20% more benign software unaffected by
the perturbations and 24% more malware crashed or ham-
pered in the uncertain environment. We also analyzed on the
crash logs from benign software undergoing non-intrusive
perturbations, and found that it was actually software bugs
that caused the crashes.
In this paper, we improved our work described in
CHAMELEON [8], and presented the following new contri-
butions.
• We designed and implemented a dynamic, per-system
call perturbation threshold based on the behavior of
software execution. We showed that such threshold is
more effective by bringing more overall adverse effects
to malware execution and less impact to benign soft-
ware execution, compared with a static threshold.
• We designed and implemented a fully automated
testbed for collecting system call traces (at kernel level)
from malware and benign software when these soft-
ware is under perturbations. Such testbed can be lever-
aged to analyze benign software behavior under OS
misbehavior and help developers pinpoint portions of
their software that are sensitive to misbehavior, thus
leading to more resilient software.
• We explored the reasons causing benign software crash
in the uncertain environment, and found that 4 out of
the 5 crashes were actually caused by software bugs
whose behavior was exposed by the perturbations we
added. We argue that resilient benign software will be
less affected by the uncertain environment. Moreover,
CHAMELEON can be used as a framework to locate soft-
ware bugs through analyzing the logged system calls
and their parameters invoked before software crashes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
our threat model and assumptions. Section 3 describes in
detail CHAMELEON’s design and implementation, including
the newly proposed per-system call perturbation thresh-
old. Section 4 describes CHAMELEON’s security and per-
formance evaluation, including our analysis of causes of
crashes for benign software in the uncertain environment.
Section 5 discusses and summarizes CHAMELEON’s results
and limitations. Section 6 summarizes related work on mal-
ware detection, software diversity, and attempts on unpre-
dictability as a security mechanism. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
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2 THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
CHAMELEON’s goal is to provide an environment that rate-
limits the effects of potential malware, while more time-
consuming deep analysis is underway. CHAMELEON’s pro-
tection is designed for corporations and similar organiza-
tions, which have already adopted a standard practice of
controlling software running at their perimeter [7]. Organi-
zations face the challenge of enforcing perimeter security,
while also requiring minimum interference to employees’
primary tasks. The combination of fast, preliminary classi-
fication by traditional machine learning methods and more
time-consuming and more accurate deep analysis for bor-
derline cases can help address this challenge.
We assume that if an organization is a target of a
well-motivated attacker, malware will eventually get in. A
classic scenario is when a C-level personnel of a targeted
organization falls victim to a spear-phishing email attack,
thereby causing an APT backdoor to be installed in one
of the computers of the victim’s company. The malware is
zero-day and is not detected by any antivirus (signature-
based and behavioral based). In a standard OS, this APT
would infiltrate and compromise the organization. With
CHAMELEON, applying in a hybrid behavioral-based de-
tection solution as described in Section 1, this APT might
receive a borderline classification at some point by a conven-
tional machine learning detector and would then be placed
in the uncertain environment. In this environment the APT
backdoor would encounter obstacles and delays to operate,
while more time and resource-consuming deep analysis is
underway.
We assume that whitelisted software receiving a bor-
derline classification by a conventional machine learning
detector can be an indication of a software compromise. Of
note, CHAMELEON does not compete with standard lines
of defenses, such as antiviruses and traditional behavioral-
based detectors, but actually complements them by equip-
ping these solutions with a safety net in the case of misdi-
agnosis.
3 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
We designed and implemented CHAMELEON for the Linux
OS. CHAMELEON offers two environments to its processes:
(i) a standard environment, which works predictably as any
OS, and (ii) an uncertain environment, where a subset of the
OS system calls undergo unpredictable interferences.
The key insight is that interference in the uncertain
environment will hamper the malware’s chances of success,
as some system calls might return errors in accessing system
resources, such as network connections or files. Moreover,
random unavailability and some delays will make gaining
CPU time difficult for malware.
3.1 The Interference Set
Our first step was deciding which system calls were
good candidates for interference. We relied on Tsai et al.’s
study [9], which ranked Linux system calls by their like-
lihood of use by applications. Based on these insights, we
selected 37 system calls for the interference set to represent
various OS functionalities relevant for malware (file, net-
work, and process-related). Most of these system calls (sum-
marized in Table 1) are I/O-bound, since I/O is essential to
most malware, regardless of its sophistication level.
We introduced new versions for all system calls in the
interference set. When CHAMELEON’s uncertainty module is
loaded, it records the pointer to each system call in the inter-
ference set as orig_<syscall_name> and alters the corre-
sponding table entry to point to my_<syscall_name>().
Category System call
File
related
sys open, sys openat, sys creat, sys read,
sys readv, sys write, sys writev, sys lseek,
sys close, sys stat, sys lstat, sys fstat,
sys stat64, sys lstat64, sys fstat64, sys dup,
sys dup2, sys dup3, sys unlink, sys rename
Network
related
sys bind, sys listen, sys connect, sys accept,
sys accept4, sys sendto, sys recvfrom,
sys sendmsg, sys recvmsg, sys socketcall
Process
related
sys preadv, sys pread64,
sys pwritev, sys pwrite64,
sys fork, sys clone, sys nanosleep
TABLE 1: System call Interference Set.
3.2 Interference Strategies
We introduced two sets of interference strategies. The first
set, non-intrusive, perturbs software execution within the OS
specification, and applies to whitelisted software running
in the uncertain environment. The second set, intrusive,
might cause corruptive perturbations, and applies to non-
whitelisted software running in the uncertain environment.
3.2.1 Non-intrusive Strategies
System call silencing with error return: The system call im-
mediately returns an error value randomly selected from
the range [-255, -1]. This strategy can create difficulties for
the execution of the process, especially if the process does
not handle errors well. Further, this strategy can cause tran-
sient unavailability to resources, such as files and network
connections, creating difficulties for malware such as a fork
bomb or a network flooder to operate. Of note, all error
returns are within the OS specification; most system calls in
Linux have an expected set of return values, and software
might fail to check for return errors.
Process delay: The system call injects a random delay within
the range [0,0.1s] during the system call execution with the
goal to drag potential malware execution. It can create dif-
ficulties in timely malware communication with a C&C for
files ex-filtration, as well as prevent flooders from sending
enough packets in a very short time, rate-limiting DoS in a
victim server.
Process priority decrease: The system call decreases the dy-
namic process priority to the lowest possible value, delaying
its scheduling to one of the system’s CPUs. This strategy
can hamper malware execution, buying time for a definitive
detection by a deep learning analyzer.
3.2.2 Intrusive Strategies
System call silencing: The system call immediately returns
a value (without being executed) indicating a successful
execution.
Buffer bytes change: The system call decreases the size of the
number of bytes in a buffer passed as a parameter to a
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system call. It can be applied to all system calls with a buffer
parameter, such as sys_read, sys_write, sys_sendto
and sys_recvfrom. This strategy can corrupt the exe-
cution of malicious scripts, thus making the exfiltration
of sensitive data more difficult. This strategy also targets
viruses, which can be adversely affected by the disruption
of the buffer with a malicious payload trying to be injected
into a victim’s ELF header, and the victim may get corrupted
and lose its ability to infect other files.
Connection restriction: The strategy changes the IP address
in sys_bind, or limits the queue length for established
sockets waiting to be accepted in sys_listen. The IP
address can be randomly changed, which will likely cause
an error, or it can be set to the IP address of a honeypot,
allowing backdoors to be traced.
File offset change: The strategy changes a file pointer in the
sys_lseek system call so that subsequent invocations of
sys_write and sys_read will access unpredictable file
contents within a specified, configurable range.
3.3 System Architecture
To implement the uncertain environment, the following
fields were added to the Linux task_struct.
process_env: It informs if the process should run in
the standard or uncertain environment.
fd_list: It keeps a list of critical file descriptors during
runtime execution. Interference on system files, such as
library or devices, will likely crash the program execution.
Thus, interference is not applied to system calls manipulat-
ing those file descriptors (see Section 3.5 for more details).
strategy_set: It informs if the process should be per-
turbed with non-intrusive strategies or intrusive strategies.
threshold: It represents the probability that a system
call from the interference set invoked by a process in the un-
certain environment will undergo interference. The higher
the threshold, the higher the probability that an interference
strategy will be applied.
Figure 1 illustrates CHAMELEON’s architecture and oper-
ation. A key component of CHAMELEON is a loadable kernel
module, the Uncertainty Module, which monitors the execu-
tion of all system calls in the interference set, and applies
a randomly chosen interference strategy to the system call,
depending on the process environment and the interference
threshold.
For example, consider Process 2 in Figure 1, loaded
in the uncertain environment invoking sys_write (Step
1). Because sys_write is in the interference set, it can
introduce uncertainty in its own execution. First the system
call inspects Process 2’s environment and finds that it runs
in the uncertain environment (Step 2). Next, sys_write
runs the corruption protection mechanism (see Section 3.5)
to make sure that no interference will occur if the system
call is accessing a critical file (Step 3). If sys_write is not
accessing a critical file, CHAMELEON decides based on the
threshold whether or not a strategy should be applied. If a
strategy is to be applied, sys_write randomly selects one
of the strategies that can be applied to its execution.
3.4 Per-System Call Interference Threshold
As an extension of CHAMELEON, representing a new contri-
bution of this paper, we introduced an optional per-system
call interference threshold. As described above, the newly
added field threshold in Linux represents the probability
that any system call from the interference set invoked by
a process in the uncertain environment will undergo in-
terference. Once configured, CHAMELEON applies the same
threshold to all system calls in the set without considering
execution context.
In real-time malware detection, the machine learning
analyzer will dynamically produce the probability of a soft-
ware being malware. We aim to adjust the threshold based
on the probability proportionally.
Because we did not include the machine learning de-
tector in this paper, we simulated a simplified situation
with a dynamically changed probability of software being
malware. The probability was considered higher when we
observed the following behaviors.
1) Frequent invocation of one type of system call or a
pattern of several system calls, such as sys_open(),
sys_fork() and sys_sendto();
2) Writing to ELF executable headers;
3) Redirection of the system standard input, output or
error;
4) Renaming or unlinking of system binaries.
Behavior (1) generalizes many types of malware opera-
tions. This behavior can represent a flooder sending millions
of packets to block a server, a botnet trying to scan victim
IPs and report back to the C&C server, a password cracker
attempting to brute-force a ssh session key, or a fork bomb
trying to use up system resources. Behavior (2) is common
for viruses trying to inject themselves into other benign
executables or source code files. Behavior (3) is common for
malware opening a backdoor or a reverse shell, a crucial step
for the operations of C&C servers. Behavior (4) is common
for malware replacing system files with Trojans. All in all,
malware lifeblood are I/O operations and they eventually
depend on one or a combination of the behaviors described
above to perform their primary malicious tasks.
Benign software, unless under debugging or configura-
tion modes, are less likely to show above behaviors, espe-
cially clusters of them. Therefore, interference on system
calls relevant to these types of behaviors should disrupt
malware more than benign software 2.
This per-system call threshold is dynamically adjusted as
follows. All processes loaded in the uncertain environment
start with a default threshold td. During a process exe-
cution, we dynamically adjust the threshold upon system
call invoking pattern. For Behavior (1), given that different
programs invoke system calls at different frequencies, we
compute “frequent invocation” from the ratio of a system
call pattern occupying the total number of system calls.
It is a per-process per-system call variable stored in the
uncertainty module.
ratio = Countsyscall/Counttotalsyscall
If ratio is larger than r, the system call pattern is considered
“frequent invocation”. As stated in Behavior (1), higher
frequency of invocations indicates higher probability of
software being malware. Therefore, the threshold and the
2. developers performing debugging tasks or system administrators
could have a different customization for the uncertain environment.
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Fig. 1: CHAMELEON’s architecture. When a process running in the uncertain environment invokes a system call in the
interference set (Step 1), the Uncertainty Module checks if the process is running in the uncertain environment (Step 2), and
depending on the execution of the corruption protection mechanism (Step 3), randomly selects an interference strategy to
apply to the system call. The corruption protection mechanism prevents interferences during accesses to critical files, such
as libraries.
ratio should be in a proportional relationship [10]. We use P
to denote the proportion, and P × ratio will be the adjusted
threshold. In any case, the threshold will be smaller than
tmax.
Since Behavior 2-4 exhibit strong likelihood of software
being malware, the threshold will be adjusted to tmax if a
process exhibits any of the behaviors from 2-4. Examples
of a process’ actions that can be classified as behaviors 2-4
are: sys_write("\177ELF") (Behavior 2), sys_dup(0),
sys_dup(1) (Behavior 3), and sys_unlink("bin") or
sys_rename("bin") (Behavior 4).
In our study we configured the parameters with r =
70%, td = 10%, P = 1.2, and tmax = 95%. tmax was
not chosen as 100%, because we do not expect processes
receiving borderline classification and transfered to the un-
certain environment to completely stop running. To avoid
early termination of the program, the dynamic threshold
only started to update when a defined amount of system
calls are monitored (100 in our case).
3.5 Corruption Protection Mechanism
The uncertainty module employs a corruption protection
mechanism to prevent interference while a process in the
uncertain environment is accessing critical system files,
which might cause early termination of the process. The
files are identified through file descriptors, created by
sys_open, sys_openat and sys_creat, and are deleted
by sys_close. System calls whose parameters are file de-
scriptors, such as sys_lseek, sys_read and sys_write,
are under this protection mechanism. These protected files
are determined by an administrator and tracked by setting
an extended attribute in the file’s inode in the .security
namespace (a similar strategy is employed by SELinux [11]).
When a process running in the uncertain environment
opens a file with a pathname beginning with critical directo-
ries or containing keywords, the file descriptor (fd) is added
to a new per-process data structure fd list. Later, when
this process invokes sys_read or sys_write referring to
an fd in fd list, the protection mechanism will prevent
interference strategies from being applied to these system
calls.
Algorithm 1 shows how the OS applies the interference
strategies on sys_write. First, the following conditions
are checked: (i) the process is running in the standard
environment (process env == 0), and (ii) the targeted
file descriptor is a critical system file (see Section 3.5). If
either of the two conditions is true the system call runs
normally. Otherwise, the system call updates its execution
counters of the current process (i.e. the total number of
system calls invoked total syscall cnt and the total num-
ber of sys_write invoked write cnt) and check whether
sys_write is within frequent system call sequences. Then
the algorithm generates a random number in the range [0,1],
and if the number is smaller than the threshold, the system
call undergoes interference.
The algorithm will randomly select one of the interfer-
ence strategies based on the strategy type. If non-intrusive
strategies are selected, one of the following strategies will
be randomly selected for execution: System call silencing
with error return, Process delay, or Process priority decrease. If
sys_write is silenced, a random error code is returned, so
that the process knows that an error occurred. If Process delay
is chosen, the algorithm randomly selects a delay for the
system call execution in the range [0, 0.1s]. If Process priority
decrease is selected, the algorithm decreases the process
priority to the minimum.
4 EVALUATION
The goal of our evaluation is to discover the impact of
CHAMELEON’s uncertain environment in affecting malware
and benign software behavior. We considered security, per-
formance, and software behavior to answer the following
research questions: (i) how will the uncertain environment
with interference strategies affect software execution? (ii)
is the per-system call interference threshold more effective
than a static threshold? (iii) how different strategies impact
the malware in the uncertain environment? and (iv) how
benign software can be more resilient in the uncertain envi-
ronment?
In general, our evaluation leveraged a collection of 113
software including common software from GNU projects
[12], SPEC CPU2006 [13] and Phoronix-test-suite [14] (47
I/O-bound and 66 CPU-bound). Our 100 malware samples
were randomly selected from THC [15] and VirusShare [16]
in different categories (22 flooders, 14 worms, 15 spyware,
24 Trojans and 25 viruses). The samples contained executa-
bles built on both x86 and x86 64 systems. All the malware
and benign software used in our experiments are detailed
in the Appendix.
We deployed and evaluated CHAMELEON on four virtual
machines (VMs) running Ubuntu 12.04 with 1GB RAM,
30GB Hard Disk, and 1 processor, one with x86 architecture,
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threshold =

tmax, P × ratio >= tmax & Countsyscall > 100
P × ratio, ratio > r & P × ratio < tmax & Countsyscall > 100
tmax, Behavior(2− 4)
td, otherwise
Algorithm 1: Applying interferences to sys_write()
Function long my sys write(fd, buf, size)
if process env == 0 or corruption protection(sys write, pid,
fd list) then
return orig sys write(fd, buf, size);
else
boolean top;
freq = isFrequentCalls(total syscall cnt++, write cnt++);
updateThreshold(freq);
if (random(0.0, 1.0) > threshold) then
return orig sys write(fd, buf, size);
end
strategy = random(1,3);
if strategy set == Intrusive then
if strategy = 1 then
/* Silence system call with error
*/
return random(-255, -1);
else if strategy = 2 then
/* Delay process */
delay(random(0, MAX DELAY));
return orig sys write(fd, buf, size);
else
/* Process priority reduction */
decrease current priority();
return orig sys write(fd, buf, size);
end
end
else
if strategy = 1 then
/* Silence system call */
return size;
else if strategy = 2 then
/* Change buffer length */
newbuf = injectRandomBytes(buf);
return orig sys write(fd, newbuf, size);
else
/* Change buffer byte */
red len = reduceLength(len);
return orig sys write(fd, buf, red len);
end
end
end
and the other with x86 64 architecture. The host machine
working as the testbed runs Ubuntu 14.04 with 16GB RAM,
160GB Hard Disk, x86 64 architecture, and 8 processors.
4.1 Testbed and Data Collection
In this subsection, we detailed the architecture of the testbed
and the process of automating scalable experiments. Figure
2 illustrates the architecture of the execution testbed. It has
four components, a central Controller, a Resource Scheduler, a
Task scheduler and a Data Collector.
The Controller works on the host and is responsible for
managing the other components. The Controller starts the
Resource Scheduler to prepare the files and parameters for all
the experiments, launches the Task Scheduler to run malware
and benign software in the test VM, and starts the Data
Collector to record system call traces and execution results
after each experiment (Step 1).
The Resource Scheduler is responsible for preparing the
environment for the test VM to start each experiment. First,
it reverts the test VM to the Snapshot storing the state
of a fresh installed and booted system. Then, it loads the
uncertainty module to the test VM system (Step 2). Finally, it
copies the software and the corresponding files and parame-
ters needed during the execution from the malware/benign
software resource pool to the test VM (Step 3).
The Task Scheduler is responsible for starting the Dionaea
[17] honeypot service in the Honeypot VMs, and executing
malware and benign software in the test VM. Since malware
in the test VM may attack other computers in the same LAN,
the Honeypot VMs are provided so that the malware can
fully exhibit its malicious behavior. For security purpose, the
Gateway is configured to block test VM (running malware)
with external traffic.
The Data Collector is responsible for collecting system call
traces logged in dmesg and the software execution results
(adversely affected or not). For system call monitoring, we
choose to hook the system call table through a loadable
kernel module rather than using strace for two reasons:
(1) our system considers the behavior from multiple pro-
cesses rather than just one; (2) malware with anti-analysis
techniques may stop executing when strace is detected.
4.2 Security
The goal of this security evaluation is to analyze the effect
of the uncertain environment in malware and benign soft-
ware execution. We considered that malware were adversely
affected by the uncertain environment if they crashed or
executed in a hampered fashion. An execution is consid-
ered Crashed if malware terminates before performing its
malicious actions. An execution is considered Succeeded if
malware accomplished its intended tasks, such as injecting
malicious payload into an executable. The following out-
comes are examples of hampered malware execution in the
uncertain environment: (1) a virus that injects only part of
the malicious code to an executable or source code file; (2)
a botnet that loses commands sent to the bot herder; (3) a
cracker that retrieves wrong or partial user credentials; (4) a
spyware that redirects incomplete stdin, stdout or stderr of
the victim; (5) a flooder that sends only a percentage of the
total number of packets it attempted.
We evaluated the effects of the uncertain environment
with 100 Linux malware samples using intrusive and non-
intrusive strategies at static and dynamic per-system call
thresholds. As Figure 3 shows, generally intrusive strategy
produced approximately 10% more Crashed and 8% fewer
Hampered execution results than non-intrusive strategies.
For both intrusive and non-intrusive strategies, the ratios
of Succeeded malware execution (infection) were almost
the same. When intrusive strategies were applied, 81% of
the malware samples failed to accomplish their tasks at
threshold 50%, 62% failed at threshold 10%, and 92% failed
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Fig. 2: The architecture of our evaluation testbed. The Controller starts the Resource Scheduler, the Task Scheduler and the
Data Collector (Step 1). The Resource Scheduler reverts the Test VM to a clean Snapshot, loads the uncertainty module
(Step 2), copies the malware or benign software resources (e.g. files and parameters needed during the execution) to the
Test VM (Step 3). The Task Scheduler starts the honeypot service in the Honeypot VMs and the execution of malware or
benign software in the Test VM (Step 4). The Data Collector reads system call traces and execution results (Step 5).
with a dynamic per-system call threshold. Non-intrusive
strategies yielded similar results for threshold 50%, 10% and
per-system call threshold, with 76%, 68%, 93% of malware
adversely affected, respectively. In general, threshold 50%
caused more Crashed and fewer Succeeded malware exe-
cution results than threshold 10%. Per-system call thresh-
old made improvements with about 25% fewer malware
Succeeded the infection, and 30% more malware Crashed
during execution than static threshold. This corroborates
our assumption that a per-system call threshold is more
effective in targeting malware, thus better protecting the
system.
We also ran our samples of general software in the un-
certain environment and observed their execution outcome.
We considered the following cases as Hampered executions:
(1) a text editor temporarily losing some functionality; (2) a
scientific tool producing partial results; (3) a network tool
missing packets. The execution outcome was considered
Crashed if the software hanged longer than twice its standard
runtime and needed to be manually killed. A Succeeded
execution generates outputs that are exactly the same as
those produced with the same test case in the standard
environment and with a runtime that does not exceed twice
that in the standard runtime.
As shown in Figure 4, compared with non-intrusive
strategies, intrusive strategy caused more adverse effects
to benign software with approximately 10% more Crashed,
7% more Hampered and 15% fewer Succeed execution. At
static threshold 10% with intrusive strategies, on average
37% of the tasks experienced some form of Crashed or
Hampered execution. With non-intrusive strategies, this
percentage was 30%. For a 50% static threshold and intru-
sive strategies, 59% of the software was adversely affected.
With non-intrusive strategies, this number was 10% smaller.
Per-system call threshold with non-intrusive strategies on
benign software made improvements with 25% more Suc-
ceeded, 15% fewer Hampered and 20% fewer Crashed exe-
cution than static threshold. With intrusive strategies, the
effects of per-system call threshold is similar with static
threshold 10%.
All the aforementioned results proved that uncertain
environment with per-system call threshold can better en-
sure the succeeded execution of benign software, and more
disproportionately bring adverse effect to malware than
static thresholds. With non-intrusive strategies, the proof
was strengthened.
4.3 Software Behavior and Performance
We compared the execution of malware and benign software
at the system call level in the uncertain environment. We
explored the effects of different software types, software
workloads and strategies.
In our experiment, modern software invoked more than
twice the number of system calls monitored than malware,
even with the existence of Flooders, which usually largely
increased the average number of system calls invoked. For
benign software the number of system calls perturbed or
silenced was only half of those for malware, mainly because
of the effectiveness of the corruption protection mechanism
introduced in Section 3.5. Benign software had a larger
number of connection attempts and read/write operation
monitored than malware.
Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of system calls
perturbed with different types of malware using non-
intrusive and intrusive strategies. The impact of intrusive
and non-intrusive strategies are similar. Generally, thresh-
old 50% caused higher percentage of perturbations than
threshold 10% and per-system call threshold, especially with
connection-related system calls (50% increase). A per-system
call threshold caused higher percentage of perturbations
than static threshold 10%, because a per-system call thresh-
old changed from td to tmax while static threshold 10% re-
mained constant at td. For all types of system calls invoked,
flooders had the highest percentage perturbed and worms
had the lowest percentage perturbed, with both static and
per-system call threshold. Based on previous work, this can
be explained by the fact that flooders invoked most system
calls in the interference set, while worms invoked least.
For the connection-related system calls perturbed, spyware
had the lowest percentage with both static and per-system
call interference threshold. With a per-system call threshold,
spyware had 0% perturbed. From our observation, spyware
usually invoked small number of network-related system
calls with a big buffer of the contents they spied. Moreover,
most of the packets were transmitted after sys_dup() sys-
tem call, therefore a per-system call threshold with tmax per-
turbing sys_dup() prevented further connection perturba-
tions. For buffer-related system calls, spyware and Trojan
received very small percentage of perturbations, indicating
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Fig. 3: Execution results for malware running in the uncertain environment using intrusive and non-intrusive strategies with
static (10% and 50%) and per-system call thresholds.
Fig. 4: Execution results for benign software running in the uncertain environment using intrusive and non-intrusive
strategies with static (10% and 50%) and per-system call thresholds.
the effectiveness of a per-system call threshold in perturbing
spyware and Trojan in an early stage before letting them
send and receive more buffers.
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results of system calls
perturbed with I/O-bound and CPU-bound software using
non-intrusive and intrusive strategies. In general, threshold
50% caused higher percentages of system calls perturbed
than threshold 10%. With static threshold 10% and 50%,
compared with IO-bound software, CPU-bound software
has a higher percentage of all the system calls perturbed,
and lower percentages of connection-related system calls
and buffer-related system calls perturbed. This can be ex-
plained that CPU-bound software invoked more buffer-
related system calls in the corruption protection mecha-
nism. Per-system call thresold with I/O-bound software
caused higher percentage of system calls perturbed than
CPU-bound software, mainly because the per-system call
thrshold had higher chances to increase the threshold in IO-
related system calls (Behaviors in Section 3.4).
One of the greatest differences between malware and
benign software is the diversity of functionality of the
latter. To ensure the fairness of analysis on benign software,
we measured the test coverage (percentage of software
instructions executed) by compiling their source code with
gcov [18], EMMA [19] and Coverage.py [20] based on the
software’s programming language. The average coverage
was 69.49%.
We analyzed the performance penalty caused by the
interference strategies, such as process delay and process
priority decrease on all 23 benchmark software whose exe-
cution could be scripted. Highly interactive software were
tested manually and showed negligible overhead. Figure 5
shows the average runtime overhead for software whose
execution could be scripted running in the uncertain en-
vironment. For runtimes ranging from 0 to 0.01 seconds,
the average penalty is 8%; for runtimes ranging from 0.1 to
1 seconds, the average penalty is 4%; for runtimes longer
than 10 seconds, the average penalty is 1.8%. This shows
that the longer the runtime, the smaller the overhead is. One
hypothesis is that software with longer execution time are
usually CPU-bound programs performing time-consuming
calculations. Because most of the system calls in the in-
terference set are I/O related, CPU-bound programs are
perturbed less and thus smaller overhead are incurred.
Fig. 5: Performance penalty for 23 benchmark software
whose execution time could be scripted. We categorized the
software according to their average runtime.
We also tested 26 benign applications with different
workloads running in the standard and the uncertain en-
vironment. The workloads contained three levels: light,
medium and heavy, which corresponded to test, train, and
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Percentage of all syscalls
perturbed
Percentage of connection-related
calls perturbed
Percentage of buffer-related
calls perturbed
10% 50% Dynamic 10% 50% Dynamic 10% 50% Dynamic
Flooders 9.74% 39.31% 37.91% 10.13% 59.29% 36.68% 6.58% 23.35% 24.92%
Spyware 2.89% 25.79% 14.33% 7.14% 48.15% 0.00% 3.06% 31.06% 0.41%
Trojan 8.09% 27.07% 21.17% 9.52% 62.14% 17.00% 7.14% 15.22% 1.81%
Viruses 5.02% 28.62% 23.47% 9.56% 47.78% 12.69% 4.96% 21.87% 17.27%
Worms 0.05% 15.67% 11.04% 9.86% 60.97% 8.11% 8.97% 14.37% 16.27%
All 0.41% 28.39% 19.80% 9.87% 60.97% 15.69% 6.83% 21.10% 13.81%
TABLE 2: Percentage of system calls perturbed running malware with different thresholds in the uncertain environment
using non-intrusive strategies.
Percentage of all syscalls
perturbed
Percentage of connection-related
calls perturbed
Percentage of buffer-related
calls perturbed
10% 50% Dynamic 10% 50% Dynamic 10% 50% Dynamic
Flooders 8.22% 39.28% 39.11% 9.56% 49.57% 38.37% 3.50% 23.11% 30.69%
Spyware 4.38% 26.39% 15.02% 16.62% 51.25% 37.96% 0.64% 27.14% 0.07%
Trojan 6.90% 35.16% 25.08% 12.49% 56.62% 19.45% 3.58% 27.47% 6.08%
Viruses 6.49% 23.03% 28.14% 12.96% 52.34% 14.30% 8.94% 22.32% 24.19%
Worms 3.92% 22.93% 13.26% 6.53% 60.59% 8.15% 3.52% 19.86% 33.24%
All 6.26% 29.90% 26.27% 11.26% 53.55% 26.79% 4.47% 24.04% 19.36%
TABLE 3: Percentage of system calls perturbed running malware with different thresholds in the uncertain environment
using intrusive strategies.
Percentage of all syscalls
perturbed
Percentage of connection-related
calls perturbed
Percentage of buffer-related
calls perturbed
10% 50% dynamic 10% 50% dynamic 10% 50% dynamic
IO 1.24% 7.65% 2.60% 5.94% 23.40% 2.50% 0.94% 6.34% 34.16%
CPU 3.42% 10.72% 0.10% 0.00% 1.97% 0.00 3.39% 10.16% 0.02%
All 2.40% 9.28% 1.28% 2.79% 12.04% 1.18% 2.24% 8.36% 15.99%
TABLE 4: Percentage of system calls perturbed running benign software with different thresholds in the uncertain
environment using non-intrusive strategies.
Percentage of all syscalls
perturbed
Percentage of connection-related
calls perturbed
Percentage of buffer-related
calls perturbed
10% 50% dynamic 10% 50% dynamic 10% 50% dynamic
IO 1.21% 5.62% 8.20% 3.57% 20.14% 2.50% 0.95% 3.88% 50.93%
CPU 3.34% 11.82% 2.40% 0.03% 2.01% 1.00% 3.49% 12.27% 8.10%
All 2.34% 8.91% 5.13% 1.69% 10.53% 1.71% 2.30% 8.33% 28.21%
TABLE 5: Percentage of system calls perturbed running benign software with different thresholds in the uncertain
environment using intrusive strategies.
ref level for SPEC CPU2006, and first, middle-most, and
last-level in the Phoronix Test Suite. On all three different
workloads, our results showed that 2 benign software were
adversely affected by non-intrusive strategies and 9 soft-
ware were affected by intrusive strategies (see Table 6). Fur-
ther, there were no significant changes on the percentages
of total system calls perturbed, connection-related system
calls perturbed and buffer-related system calls perturbed
with the change of workloads for both types of interference
strategies. The results indicate that the workload type of the
tested software does not impact the program outcome in
the uncertain environment for the two sets of interference
strategies we used.
To understand the effects of different strategies, we
carried out experiments running a flooder in the victim
system. In each experiment (running for 1 minute), the
flooder will be running in the standard environment (no
strategy), or perturbed with one strategy or a combination
of all strategies. To simulate a real-world test case, a piece
of software was running some processes as background
workload in the system. The software was configured to
run with either a normal workload or a heavy workload.
We measured the number of system calls invoked by the
flooder and summarized the results.
As Figure 6 shows at normal background workload, with
strategy system call silencing with error return, the total num-
ber of system calls invoked increased by 4% (from 6,913,041
to 7,187,094), compared with no strategy employed. The
reason is that flooders would immediately retry when a
packet failed, saving the time for waiting for responses.
With strategy delay only, the total number of system calls
invoked decreased by one third. When we randomly chose
a strategy each time, the result was the best—smallest
number of system calls being successfully sent. Strategy
priority decrease did not make any difference than applying
no strategy, and this was because the flooder program had
already been scheduled with the lowest priority in the
server. Thus, we increased the background workload to
heavy (more processes running), so that the flooder program
can have higher priority. In the case of heavy background
workload, the number of system calls a flooder could send
in the standard environment decreased by more than half.
Priority decrease demonstrated strong effectiveness by mak-
ing a sharp decrease on the total number of system calls
invoked. This could be explained by software under heavy
workload running more background processes than under
normal workload, and some of the background processes
having a priority lower than the flooder. Therefore, a ran-
dom decrease of the flooder’s priority saved more system
resources to the other benign but low-prioritized processes.
Regardless of the background workloads, running mixed
strategies yielded better results with fewest packets sent
than these running a single strategy.
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Percentage of
syscalls perturbed
Percentage of
connection-related
syscalls perturbed
Percentage of
buffer-related
syscalls perturbed
Number of
Crashes
Workload Non-intrusive Intrusive Non-intrusive Intrusive Non-intrusive Intrusive Non-intrusive Intrusive
Light 4.3% 5.1% 0.0% 0.1% 2.9% 4.2% 2 9
Medium 5.8% 6.3% 0.2% 0.3% 3.1% 3.7% 2 9
Heavy 5.2% 5.9% 0.2% 0.2% 3.5% 3.0% 2 9
TABLE 6: Impact of non-intrusive and intrusive strategies on 26 benign software from Phoronix Test Suite and SPEC CPU
for different workloads in the uncertain environment (static threshold 10%).
Fig. 6: Comparison among different types of strategies in the
number of system calls invoked by a flooder, with normal
and heavy background workloads.
4.3.1 Case Study: Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
In this section we show the evaluation of the interference
strategies with an APT attack. We simulated a watering hole
attack similar to the Black Vine APT from Symantec [21]. This
attack has three main components: a Trojan, a backdoor and
a keylogger. First, the attacker sends a spear-phishing e-mail
to a user with a link for downloading the Trojan encryption
tool. If the user clicks on the link and later uses the Trojan
tool to encrypt a file, the tool downloads and executes a
backdoor from a C&C server while encrypting the requested
file. Then, the backdoor copies the directory structure and
the ssh host key from the user’s machine into a file and
sends it to the C&C server. After the backdoor executes,
the attacker deletes any traces of the infection without
affecting the Trojan’s encryption/decryption functionality.
The attacker will also install a keylogger to obtain root
privileges. Next, the backdoor runs a script that uploads
sensitive data to the C&C server.
The Trojan is written in C using libgcrypt for encryption
and decryption. It uses the curl library for downloading
the backdoor from the Internet. In our simulation we used
the logkeys keylogger [22]. The backdoor script uses scp for
sending the data to the C&C server.
APT in the Uncertain Environment: From the system
call traces we collected, the first malicious behavior oc-
curred when the backdoor was being configured, with a
sys_write() invoked with a buffer parameter starting
with ”\ 177ELF. This behavior caused the threshold to
increase to tmax on the sys_write() system call. Later,
three pairs of sys_dup2() with file descriptors 0 and 1 are
invoked afterwards to execute the backdoor. The threshold
on the three sys_dup2() was increased to tmax again.
Then, when sys_read() on the ssh host key files was in-
voked, the threshold decreased to td. Finally, the keylogger
started, sys_write() was invoked to write to a log file
and sys_connect() and sys_sendto() were invoked
for the backdoor to communicate with the C&C server. In
our 15 experiments, 9 of them crashed before setting up the
backdoor, and another 4 of them crashed before starting
the keylogger. None of them successfully completed the
attack by communicating to the C&C server. Actually, the
probability for the simulated APT to gain privilege and
exfiltrate data is under (1−tmax)×(1−tmax)3×(1−td%),
which is 0.14%.
4.3.2 CHAMELEON towards OS uncertainties
Since non-intrusive strategies consider only perturbations
within the OS specification, software still experiencing
crashed/hampered execution should be further analyzed.
We explored the reasons behind the crashes or hampered
executions, so that benign software could improve itself to
better adapt to the interference strategies. We analyzed the
execution logs manually, through examining from the last
system call and its parameters in a reversed order. Usually
it is the failure of one system call request with a specific
parameter that lead to the early termination of a program.
Therefore, locating the corresponding system call and the
parameter will reveal the reason for the software crash,
and help find bugs of the software. The reasons behind a
software bug may be many. From our observation, some of
the bugs may emerge again after being ‘fixed’ for a while.
CHAMELEON is capable of interfering every system call with
a probability, and logging the execution details about the
crash.
During our analysis, we found that the crashes in Vim,
tar, Mozilla Firefox and Thunderbird were in fact software
bugs reported before on Launchpad and Bugzilla [30, 31].
Because each system call was perturbed with a probability,
the perturbations causing the crash in different tests varied
on the same software (we ran each software fifteen times
and averaged the results). Therefore, more than one bugs
could be found for one piece of software. Table 7 lists
the bugs in detail. Besides general bugs, e.g. Segmentation
Fault, Fatal I/O error and Bus error, we found several bugs
of particular interest.
.viminfo [23]: This bug causes Vim to fail launching
because of an erroneous .viminfo file. The .viminfo file is
used to remember the information about last edit by a user.
If the user exit Vim and later start it again, .viminfo file
enables the user to continue where left off [32]. In our
experiment, the .viminfo error was caused by silencing a
sys_write on .viminfo file. In the reported bug, the error
was caused by an operation using a special character not
recognized by Vim before exiting. With CHAMELEON, we
identified the reason of Vim stops launching is because of
failure in sys_open on .viminfo from our log file.
tar -C empty directory [24]: This bug occurs when one
extracts the empty directories inside an archive using the ‘-
C’ option to change directories. The cause for the bug is tar
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Software Bugs
Vim viminfo: Illegal starting char [23]
tar Fail using ’-C’ option extracting archive with empty directories [24]“Operation not permitted” when extracting [25]
Thunderbird Unable to locate mail spool file [26]segmentation fault (core dumped) [27]
Firefox Bus error (core dumped) [28]Fatal IO error (Operation not permitted) on X server [29]
TABLE 7: Software bugs found by CHAMELEON
using mkdir (file_name, mode) instead of mkdirat
(chdir_fd, file_name, mode) to extract a directory.
With CHAMELEON, we identified the failure of creating a
new file descriptor with sys_openat in our log file.
Thunderbird mail spool file [26]: The bug causes Thun-
derbird to hang when linking an existing email account.
Thunderbird uses the spool file to “help” the user set up an
email account with the assumption that the email providers
well address SMTP, ports, and security configurations is-
sues. Unfortunately, few of them are correctly configured
[33]. From the log file of CHAMELEON, we identified the fail-
ure in linking an account is because of failure in sys_read
of spool file.
To sum up, our results show that the crashes and adverse
effects in the analyzed software was due more to bugs than
the perturbations applied by CHAMELEON. It appears that
the perturbations accelerated the exposure of such bugs.
5 DISCUSSION
As we discussed in Section 2, a resourceful and motivated
adversary can bypass any protection mechanism. Even
though the uncertain environment is designed to rate-limit
stealthy malware, malware can still accomplish its goals
while running in such environment. For example, highly
fault-tolerant malware will be resilient to the uncertain
environment.
There are some trade-offs in selecting an interference
strategy. Intrusive strategies are more aggressive, and will
affect software running in the uncertain environment more.
For an organization with high security demands and less
tolerance for non-approved software, intrusive strategies
will offer more protection.
Strategy Process Delay is different from just suspending
software execution. A suspended execution stops suspicious
software from running and will not generate data for deep
learning analysis. Process Delay, on the other hand, slows
down software execution, thus potentially buying time for
deep analysis and allowing for a more accurate classification
of software which received borderline confidence levels
in classifications by a fast conventional machine learning
detector. Moreover, suspension of execution can be detected
by malware just by checking wall clock time.
Although CHAMELEON was implemented for Linux (to
be freely distributed to the public), it can also be imple-
mented in any modern OS, such as Windows, which is a
popular target of malware attacks. Finally, we are aware that
the degree of uncertainty is not a one-size-fits-all solution—
we expect an administrator to dial in the level of uncertainty
to the needs of the organization and applications.
Finally, we believe that CHAMELEON can also be used as
a framework to test software resilience under OS misbehav-
ior.
6 RELATED WORK
Our work intersects the areas of malware detection, soft-
ware diversity and deception, and fuzz testing. This section
summarizes how they have been used in software design
and highlights under-studied areas.
Malware Detection: There are extensive literature dat-
ing to the 1990s on detection of intrusions and malware.
Malware detection techniques can be signature-based [3, 4]
or behavior-based [34, 35, 36].
Signature-based approaches match bytes and instruc-
tions from known malware to the unknown program under
analysis. These techniques are accurate, but they can be
evaded when attackers use polymorphism and metamor-
phism to create malware variants; these variants have the
same behavior but have different byte signatures. Further,
these approaches cannot detect zero-day malware and have
a practical detection rate ranging from 25% to 50% [5].
Behavior-based techniques, which can be static or dy-
namic, analyze program behavior and attempt to detect
events, instructions or resource access that are indicative of
malware. Behavioral solutions based on static analysis [35]
analyze the source code of malware and benign applications
in an attempt to extract their unique behavior in high
level specifications. Most of the work on dynamic behavior-
based malware detection [34, 36] are based on seminal work
by Forrestet al. [34]. System call-based malware detectors
suffer, however, from high false positive rates due to the
diverse nature of system calls invoked by applications.
This challenge has worsened as programs are becoming
increasingly diverse [36].
Some approaches analyze the data flow of a program
to extract malware behavior. Panorama [37], for example,
performs system-level taint-tracking to discover how mal-
ware leaks sensitive data. Martignoniet al. [38] leveraged
hierarchical behavioral graphs to infer high-level behav-
ior of low-level events. The approach traces the execution
of a program, performing data-flow analysis to discover
relevant actions such as proxying, data leaking and key
stroke logging. Ether [39] improved on tracing granular-
ity on single instructions and system calls via hardware
virtualization extensions. Yeet al. [40] proposed a semi-
parametric classification model for combining file content
and file relation information to improve the performance of
file sample classification.
More recently, Bromium [5] proposed the use of vir-
tualization on a per-process basis to isolate every process
from the system and from each other. While this certainly
advances the level of granularity offered by traditional sand-
boxes, it has some inconveniences for the user (e.g., it creates
obstacles to inter-process communication) and cannot guar-
antee complete perimeter protection (e.g., a keylogger still
can record credentials).
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CHAMELEON’s goal is to provide an environment where
possible malware can be rate-limited, while time-consuming
deep analysis is underway.
Diversity and Deception: The ability to diversify behav-
ior within a system is an essential building block for un-
predictability. Diversifying components within the software
stack can improve overall robustness. Researchers have
studied building diverse computer systems. Forrestet al.
[41] proposed guidelines and advocated the use of random-
ized compilation techniques, which motivated later work in
this area [42]. Forrest and her colleagues [43] also showed
that code exhibits evolutionary characteristics similar to
those seen in the biological world. A program, like a bio-
logical organism, has the potential to mutate but can still
function normally [43].
Several projects mitigate buffer overflows and other
memory errors by randomizing system call mappings,
global library entry points, stack placement, stack direction,
and heap placement—often in conjunction with running
multiple versions in parallel to detect divergence [44].
To a limited extent, deception has been an implicit
technique for cyber warfare and defense, but is under-
studied as a fundamental abstraction for secure systems.
Honeypots and honeynets [45] are systems designed to look
like production systems in order to deceive intruders into
attacking the systems or networks so that the defenders can
learn new techniques.
Several technologies for providing deception have been
studied. Software decoys are agents that protect objects from
unauthorized access [46]. The goal is to create a belief in the
attacker’s mind that the defended systems are not worth
attacking or that the attack was successful. The researchers
considered tactics such as responding with common sys-
tem errors and inducing delays to frustrate attackers. Red-
teaming experiments at Sandia tested the effectiveness of
network deception on attackers working in groups. The
deception mechanisms at the network level successfully
delayed attackers for a few hours. Almeshekah and Spaf-
ford [47] further investigated the adversaries’ biases and
proposed a model to integrate deception-based mechanisms
in computer systems. In all these cases, the fictional systems
are predictable to some degree; they act as real systems
given the attacker’s inputs.
True unpredictability requires randomness at a level that
would cause the attacker to collect inconsistent results. This
observation leads to the notion of inconsistent deception [48],
a model of deception that challenges the cornerstone of
projecting false reality with internal consistency. Sunet al.
[49, 50] also argued for the value of unpredictability and
deception as OS features. In this paper we explored non-
intrusive unpredictable interferences to create an uncertain
environment for software being deep analyzed after an
initial borderline classification.
Fuzz Testing: Fault injection is an important method
for generating test cases in fuzz testing. Through fault
injection, researchers are able to study fault propagation
[51] and develop flexible and robust software and systems
[52, 53, 54]. Kanawati and Abraham provide a methodology
and guidelines for the design of flexible software, based on
their experience with the fault injection tool FERRARI [52].
Fault injection has been applied to a number of abstrac-
tions. DOCTOR [53], for example, supports memory faults,
CPU faults, and communication faults. FINE [51] traces
execution flow and key variables through the UNIX kernel
via hardware-induced software errors and kernel software
faults injection. A recent survey on assessing dependability
with software fault injection [55] provides a comprehensive
overview of the state of the art fault injection approaches
to fit the goals of researchers and practitioners. LFI tool
[56] injects errors in library-calls, in order to identify error
handling faults that arise from misunderstanding of library
APIs, and from poor portability across different OSes. Other
possible forms of fault injection are code mutations and
data interface corruptions [57]. CHAMELEON is similar by
injecting faults (interferences) in the execution of software
at the kernel system call level.
Fuzz testing is an effective way to discover coding
errors and security loopholes in software, operating sys-
tems, and networks by testing applications against invalid,
unexpected, or random data inputs. Miller et al. [58] first
proposed fuzz testing as an inexpensive mechanism to gen-
erate additional software tests. The authors later extended
the work [59] to identify missed return code checks from
crucial calls, such as memory allocation. Many additional
fuzz testing approaches have been proposed [60, 61, 62].
Trinity [63], for example, randomizes system call parameters
to test the validation of file descriptors, and found real bugs
[64], including bugs in the Linux kernel [65, 66, 67]. White-
box fuzzy testers [68, 69, 70] were also proposed to increase
the coverage of test inputs by leveraging symbolic execution
and dynamic test generation. For instance, KLEE [69] uses
symbolic execution and a model of system call behaviors
provided by a user to generate high-coverage test cases.
BALLISTA [71] tests the data type robustness of the POSIX
system call interface in a scalable way, by defining 20 data
types for testing 233 system calls of the POSIX standard.
CHAMELEON can also be considered as a fuzz tester at
the OS system call API to understand how resilient an
application is to a particular type of misbehavior.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work we introduced a detailed description of the
design and implementation, as well as new extensions of
CHAMELEON, a novel Linux framework which allows the
introduction of uncertainty as an OS built-in feature to
rate-limit the execution of possible malware that received
a borderline classification by traditional machine learning
detectors, while a second, performance expensive deep-
learning analysis is underway. CHAMELEON’s protection
target are organizations, where it is a common practice
to restrict software running in the organization perimeter.
CHAMELEON offers two environments for software running
in the system: (i) standard, which works according to the
OS specification and (ii) uncertain, for any software that
receives a borderline classification by traditional machine
learning based detectors. In the uncertain environment
software experiences a set of perturbations, which create
obstacles for their execution, while deep-learning analysis
is underway.
We evaluated CHAMELEON on Linux with 113 common
applications and 100 malware samples from various cate-
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gories. We define success of software execution in the uncer-
tain environment as benign software tolerating uncertainty
and users obtaining useful results from benign software
in the system. Our results showed that at a threshold of
10%, intrusive strategies thwart 62% of malware, while non-
intrusive strategies caused a failure rate of 68%. At threshold
50%, the percentage of adversely affected malware increased
to 81% and 76% respectively. With a 10% threshold, the per-
turbations also cause various levels of disruption (crash or
hampered execution) to approximately 30% of the analyzed
benign software. With a 50% threshold, the percentage of
software adversely affected raised to 50%. We also found
that I/O-bound software was three times more affected by
uncertainty than CPU-bound software.
A dynamic, per-system call threshold caused various
levels of disruption to only 10% of the analyzed benign
software. The effects of the uncertain environment in mal-
ware was more pronounced with 92% our studied malware
samples failing to accomplish their tasks. Compared to the
results obtained for a static threshold, 20% more benign
software succeeded and 24% more malware crashed or were
hampered in the uncertain environment.
We also analyzed the behavior of crashed benign soft-
ware, and found that many of the crashes were caused by
software bugs. Several bugs were reproduced for Vim, tar,
Mozilla Firefox and Thunderbird.
Besides effectively enabling the combination of the best
of traditional machine learning and emerging deep learning
methods and providing a “safety net” for failures of stan-
dard intrusion detection systems, CHAMELEON improves
system security by (i) making systems diverse by design,
(ii) increasing attackers’ work factor, and (iii) decreasing the
success probability and speed of attacks.
The idea of making systems less predictable is auda-
cious, nonetheless, our results indicate that an uncertain
system can be feasible for raising an effective barrier against
sophisticated and stealthy malware. The degree of uncer-
tainty is not a one-size-fits-all solution—we expect an ad-
ministrator to dial in the level of uncertainty to the needs of
the organization and applications.
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CPU-bound I/O-bound
specrand lbm h264ref libquantum sjeng ’ diff sendxmpp nslookup ’ netstat tcpdump nmap
soplex ’ mcf tar* ’ namd gromacs cksum sendmail ls ss dig ifconfig
omnetpp astar a2ps tail accton spell route ping arp nano pico
lastcomm head dump-acct sort cppi ebizzy lpstat vim * ’ xte ’ echo wget * ’
teseq grep gcal gcal2txt tcal crafty emacs’ mkdir traceroute ’ truncate nice
txt2gcal wdiff moe ’ screen ’ h246ref c-ray cut service df du host
find paxutils shar unshar uuencode hmmer firefox * skype thunderbird * ’ gedit fs-mark ’
enscript ad2c libextractor csv2rec python ’ nero2d cp rm ab chrome libreoffice
recdel tar recinf ruby gcc mrbayes surblhost gurgle gv ctags mkafmmap
javac ’ recfmt cyclictest ’ multichase himeno blogbench barcode iozone ’
dolfyn encode-ogg espeek ffte fhourstones gcrypt
TABLE 8: List of the 113 benign software tested in our evaluation. Software adversely affected by non-intrusive strategies
(*) and intrusive strategies (’) are marked. Software tested under different workloads are bold.
Malware Category Malware Name Malware Name
Flooders VirusShare 0a6c05d448d41a549bf8949a41a8e4d3 VirusShare 0df5910e6e5f865fddf2d4a4911893fb
Flooders VirusShare 1a39b759416597743a7357634cb29743 VirusShare 1cc96351edd803bdaf849978d3e6c1cf
Flooders VirusShare 1d254d60fc8c588e3ad23ea55e84af1e VirusShare 1d57994e9ee7b308ea5f767dcd04195a
Flooders VirusShare 1da85ad45cb7e66738cdb0e050dca2e2 VirusShare 2b9125e77e18926fe6b99b93f79da92e
Flooders VirusShare 6b174d94b2b20a506cfdd4074be6df05 VirusShare 47e6947dad6821745d9d24e31a894400
Flooders VirusShare 25689d63d0476435e752c9bf61bf2942 VirusShare a3b5646f130a129edef7273606de8952
Flooders VirusShare b8f97d0ba7d21e5b08d98f32ccb97fec VirusShare e1bc6b6911feba3692579c771cc451e4
Flooders VirusShare edf4d6003c9c68774438e4fb25198dab VirusShare ffc7be26912b5aca63e55dc7c830f28a
Flooders VirusShare ff4dbe26278bfda759ee8b1f10d94d3b VirusShare b16de6aa853cab944503825e08cca9b3
Flooders VirusShare b31ae7e6de5da850f91bd4c9c4a47da0 VirusShare b74a48a7555c6ae6a260b0a3ff7e6aa2
Flooders VirusShare b96ee50d33a6b376b67f257718e211f8 VirusShare b367a540ef865acea0fb00d41c91f378
Spyware VirusShare 0a07cf554c1a74ad974416f60916b78d VirusShare 0b283a19a141030be3e8188896d9510b
Spyware VirusShare 0d2dfefb9cfa7d082e9e0d13a28e9722 VirusShare 1dc810f0f0d905046caaad1ea6f79b0e
Spyware VirusShare 00f7adbe9895699b07a114e383787c74 VirusShare 0d057b1b2d81728cb97f5484e9344fc0
Spyware VirusShare 986f442fea7f98579e8a2b4a52f961ab lkl
Spyware logkeys VirusShare fd46acb36263b0155e644941a9e6f03a
Spyware VirusShare fe2df5014dd6f67dc15dffdba25ddd9d VirusShare b5c3730f4c373ea6cd9f8e770b332de6
Spyware VirusShare b7aedd8e6907acde2c2ca72ea18e1ac8 VirusShare b67d0e7a6fdc712aded5bd1a64cfb3e0
Spyware VirusShare b790de9fc2921caa97be21236446d6bf
Trojan VirusShare 0b57ab2f37580a84219dd2faaa9f3444 VirusShare 1b7f7a6af703002c56754c826459e109
Trojan VirusShare 01c5f86372a4f31e72675f8be9b4e6c7 VirusShare 1a6e2a1ebaa423ba2974c3e66f734f2c
Trojan VirusShare 5a16c12e1abe11317465ea4032aa25aa VirusShare 52be89c6e6b108b610dfe2cb67b9fe4e
Trojan VirusShare 753d5e7af271c12e0803956dd8c2b8e6 VirusShare bc3c6f56c85ecd1a7b8bbded84f7e6cd
Trojan Botnet VirusShare e414088f88b329c99aac2ebdfa5aad23
Trojan VirusShare ef112ebf02f0ded52207eed236084cd9 ncrack
Trojan Trojanit httpd
Trojan VirusShare ff4bdef83f191cd6451e26a09311bcd2 VirusShare fda2e5692426454eaf663f7684281955
Trojan VirusShare fdbfffa9bbc918a1b780e54249d3fc99 VirusShare b2cc8e0741d07be0d34b4ea5cdd00f31
Trojan VirusShare b21c7770a6b16c166a1dee6eefcf68a1 VirusShare b24ef5e799b9569377d8705d91bceb38
Trojan VirusShare b62f3df6160145643a2f30d635f2476c VirusShare b77e81d28c2585489e07ccdbec8eb883
Trojan VirusShare b94ab416758569167a54abef295c599b VirusShare b747e8639341958e9c172b6e0c973355
Viruses VirusShare 0a4b022d6865dc32bb246c8b57aadb06 VirusShare 1c41538ccd680edfc0a5e36021fc37e5
Viruses VirusShare 2c45f0f3dc02d8772f875cc5184459ec VirusShare 1a46e25a5c3419f1dbc7b63b59053ab3
Viruses VirusShare 3deec7f4fa618f6a97e7f7af33edb299 VirusShare 8b1ba12a6246829d774ccfdba27db0d6
Viruses VirusShare 8b754b0219aad9bed5da083b9a034352 VirusShare 8b7521ab69a46902087af19455b21e19
Viruses VirusShare 13ee81ea357a97f1d879b91c827a5629 VirusShare 56c7dcc249a715e05e5604d142d6d1e8
Viruses VirusShare 217ece604b4e4a0f766c4ea8aa218519 VirusShare 522a4cdb1f05fdda5f390b31a95f7ae3
Viruses VirusShare 7139ce345ffdacfc92d0cc70e8830320 VirusShare 79927828f9c2e7a015b94c59f4cfe2bb
Viruses VirusShare d19ad58b5807415b2e1cb3a503755c59 dataseg
Viruses VirusShare ed91cd156c154865859deac9e635acb0 VirusShare f0e879988dd417dc02da7d5def6367cf
Viruses VirusShare f11ccc4acb53495a871b278c5efa6b98 VirusShare fbf05500579ac4c597998d3359a76c42
Viruses iamsick manpage
Viruses vlpi VirusShare fd40c417fb687341b8673f6de4e34aef
Viruses VirusShare b50ddaa7162db9817938af18940c81ab
Worms VirusShare 0a477a043a8b3deba999bbbfa1c32f47 VirusShare 0ba3e70816496e5f9d45912f9f15fb76
Worms VirusShare 0cd70e3262a214fd104813826dd612c9 VirusShare 0e4cca1b162c3a9035214058f93a97b4
Worms VirusShare 1d6fa5ed0080a0997f51a86697b8392c VirusShare 3c2bd0548bf8c33566a5bda743441cf0
Worms VirusShare 447bc42013537c5173e575cf0d166937 VirusShare 986f442fea7f98579e8a2b4a52f961ab
Worms VirusShare 20719a9e850c07ac60d548a546ec0a7f VirusShare e8ff4cb488fea8e0ad78e8dc28ae884c
Worms kaiowas10 ssl-crack
Worms VirusShare fe2b2560121db8d08d044bc2d579eac4 VirusShare b4ba07c4d9b781635b33d485b73a614f
TABLE 9: List of the 100 malware samples used in our evaluation. We named malware with their executable file name.
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